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This paper provides a general framework for analyzing the optimal degree and form of financial integration.
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or autarky, autarky may be superior.  The intuition is simple: if underlying technologies are not convex,
then risk-sharing can lower expected utility.  The simplistic models arguing for financial integration
typically employed in economics assume convexity; but the world is rife with non-convexities, e.g.
associated with bankruptcy.  The architecture of the credit market can, for instance, affect the likelihood
of a bankruptcy cascade, “contagion,” and systemic risk.
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Integration of global financial markets was supposed to lead to greater financial stability, 
as risks were spread around the world. The financial crisis has thrown doubt on this conclusion. 
A failure in one part of the global economic system caused a global “meltdown.”  The recent 
crisis has shown that in the absence of appropriate government intervention, privately profitable 
transactions may lead to systemic risk. This paper provides a general analytic framework within 
which we can analyze the optimal degree (and form) of financial integration. Within this general 
framework, full integration is not in general optimal.  Indeed, faced with a choice between two 
polar regimes, full integration or autarky, in the simplified model autarky may be superior. 
 
I. The Problem.  
Those concerned with designing electric networks have worried about analogous 
problems. With an integrated electric grid the total capacity required to limit the probability of a 
blackout to a particular level can be reduced. But a failure in one part of the system can lead to 
system-wide failure; in the absence of integration, the failure would have been geographically 
constrained. Well-designed networks have circuit breakers, to prevent the “contagion” of the 
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 failure of one part of the system to others. Advocates of unbridled liberalization, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), have paid little attention to these risks. Indeed, in some 
quarters, such circuit breakers—such as the temporary imposition of capital controls—have been 
vehemently opposed, even though worries about contagion were used to justify massive 
interventions. But diversification and contagion are different sides of the same coin:  greater 
financial integration (especially if not done carefully) increases the risk of adverse contagion in 
the event of a large negative shock. An analysis of financial integration should weigh the costs 
with the benefits and begin by asking if there are ways of designing the financial architecture that 
minimize the downside risk while preserving as much of the upside potential as possible.  
A. The General Framework.  
In a series of papers (Bruce Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003; Domenico Delli Gatti et al., 
2006; Mauro Gallegati et al., 2008; Stefano Battiston et al., 2009; Stiglitz, 2010), we have been 
investigating alternative global architectures. Simple architectures include autarky, where no 
cross-border capital flows are allowed, and regional arrangements, where no restrictions are 
imposed on flows within a group of countries but certain restrictions are allowed in the flows 
between the groups. Restrictions on capital flows in times of crises act as circuit breakers. 
Alternative architectures are evaluated in terms of  “expected utility,” which takes account both 
mean country performance and variability. We focus in particular on how a shock to one part of 
the system (one country) can lead to systemic risk through contagion and amplification or 
adverse impacts might be diminished through risk sharing. 
B. First intuition.  
It is well known that, in the absence of a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities or an 
effective surrogate, the Nash equilibrium will not be efficient. The actions of one unit impose externalities on others. Our focus here is on the particular set of externalities associated with risk. 
The Greenwald-Stiglitz Fundamental Inefficiency Theorem (1986) shows that even with rational 
expectations, so long as risk markets are incomplete, the market equilibrium will be inefficient. 
As each market participant makes his investment decision, he affects the price distribution. The 
current crisis illustrates:  as each invested more and more in housing, the price of (say sub-prime) 
housing would be lower in the event of a state “s” such that they all (or even many) might want 
to sell. While there is ample evidence that market participants did not act rationally, the 
Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem shows that such adverse outcomes can happen even had they been 
rational. 
In these second-best situations, imposing restrictions on the set of interactions 
(relationships) may be welfare enhancing. For instance, trade liberalization between two 
countries with negatively correlated outputs may reduce price volatility but increase income 
volatility, so much so that all groups in both countries are worse off (David Newbery and 
Stiglitz, 1982). In an overlapping generations model, capital market liberalization impairs the 
extent to which a productivity shock at one time is “shared” with future generations (as increased 
incomes raise savings and thus future wages) and thus can lower ex ante expected utility 
(Stiglitz, 2004).   
C. Second intuition.  
But there is an even more compelling reason that global integration may not be desirable. 
The intuition behind why integration should be desirable was based on “convexity”:  with 
convex technologies and concave utility functions, risk sharing is always beneficial. The more 
globally integrated the world economy, the better risks are “dispersed.”  But if technologies are not convex, then risk sharing can lower expected utility. While simplistic models typically 
employed in economics assume convexity, the world is rife with non-convexities.  
This is not the place to provide a catalogue of important non-convexities. Information 
structures, learning processes, R&D, and externalities themselves give rise to a natural set of 
non-convexities. Bankruptcy introduces a key non-convexity. These in turn may give rise to the 
financial accelerator (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003), which implies that the effect of a shock can 
be amplified and lead to a process of trend reinforcement. A firm experiencing a negative 
shock—forcing it closer to the brink of bankruptcy—will have to pay higher interest rates, 
implying an increased likelihood of a further decline in net worth.  
Even without financial market interlinkages, there can be extensive interdependencies 
through which a shock in one part of the system can be transmitted to others. Liquidity crises are 
associated with “forced” sales of assets, leading to price declines, adversely affecting any 
collateral based lending, with obvious macro-economic consequences.  Financial linkages, while 
they may enhance risk sharing, may increase these adverse effects. Bankruptcy cascades 
(Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, 2000; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003) illustrate the potential 
adverse effects. The bankruptcy of one firm affects the likelihood of the bankruptcy of those to 
whom it owes money, its suppliers and those who might depend upon it for supplies; and so 
actions affecting its likelihood of bankruptcy have adverse effects on others. While contracts 
may try to control the worst actions (e.g. through bond covenants), these are limited and only 
partially effective.  
Further externalities are generated as a result of information costs and imperfections. If 
unit i doesn’t fully know other units’ characteristics—including the relationships (contracts) of those with whom it engages in a relationship, including all the relationships with whom those are 
engaged, ad infinitum—it cannot know the risks of their honoring their contract.  
The “architecture” of the credit market can affect the risk that one bankruptcy leads to a 
sequence of others. If A lends to B, B lends to C, and C lends to D, then a default in D can lead 
to a bankruptcy cascade. On the other hand, if lending all goes through a sufficiently well 
capitalized clearing house (a bank), then a default by one borrower is not as likely to lead to a 
cascade—other things being equal. But other things are never equal:  the first structure may have 
some informational advantages, if A has (say as a byproduct of its trade relationships with B) 
information about B and its behavior that the bank would not have, or could obtain only at a high 
cost.
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Moreover, in large non-linear systems with complex interactions, even small 
perturbations can have large consequences; even seemingly small changes in structure 
(introducing new “connections” or contracts) can alter systemic stability. As our financial system 
became increasingly intertwined, through complex credit default swaps and other derivatives, too 
little thought was given to these matters, by the financial wizards that were creating the new 
products, by the bankers that were marketing them, by the economists that were touting their 
  Moreover, the “centralized” lending architecture may be more vulnerable to shocks to the 
“centers” (illustrated by the global impact of the U.S. credit crisis). Architectures that may better 
absorb random uncorrelated shocks may perform more poorly in the case of correlated shocks 
(“targeted attacks”); those that absorb small to medium shocks may perform more poorly in the 
case of large shocks.  
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stability of the system.  
II. A Canonical Model.  
A. The Model. 
We now consider a polar case focusing on losses from system failure. Assume that output 
in country i is a function of a random variable, Si, which can be thought of as the stock of 
available capital. Production is linear in S, provided S is greater than some critical number S*; 
when S≤S*, system failure occurs, and a loss of -C occurs. Assume that Si = -α1 with probability 
p, α2 with probability 1 - p, such that pα1=(1-p)α2, i.e. expected output without bankruptcy is 
zero. (This is just a normalization.)  For simplicity, we assume S* = 0 and C < α1 and α2 < α1, i.e. 
p < .5:  There is a small probability of “disaster,” which is uncorrelated across countries. Prior to 
liberalization, expected output is -pC + (1-p)α2 = p(α1-C). We now consider integration among N 
countries. Assume N = 2.  With full liberalization, p(ΣSi  ≤ 0) = 1 - (1-p)
2  i.e. both countries go 
bankrupt if only one country has a bad outcome; and expected output (per country) is (1-p)
2α2 - 
C(1-(1-p)
2) < -pC + (1-p)α2. 
Liberalization is unambiguously welfare decreasing. A slightly weaker threshold for 
bankruptcy gives more ambiguous results.  Assume bankruptcy occurs if ΣSi/N ≤ K < 0. Stiglitz 
(2010) shows that, for N=2, there exists a critical value of p such that if p≤ p* (equivalently, α2 
≥α2*) liberalization is welfare reduced:  if disaster occurs rarely but seriously, liberalization is 
undesirable. The critical p* is defined by p* = (1-ς)(1-2ς), where ς ≡ 2K/α1. If ς ≥ 1, then 
liberalization is always desirable. If ς = 0 (K = 0)—the case discussed earlier—it is never 
desirable.  More generally, if there are N countries, there is a critical p* for each N and K such that if 
p ≤ p*(N,K) liberalization is not desirable.
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B. Further results.  
  It is obvious, using the law of large numbers, that if 
K = 0, as N goes to infinity, crisis (systemic failure) occurs with probability one, so full 
liberalization is never desirable. 
The global financial architecture describes the pattern and form of relationships. Stiglitz 
(2010) uses variants of the canonical model (e.g. where the probability of failure itself may 
depend on N or where production itself is a concave function of S above the critical threshold) to 
examine the determinants of the desirability of global financial integration. Consider a simple 
global financial architecture in which countries are divided into “clubs,” and there is full 
integration within the club, and no “capital flows” across clubs. Under many parametrizations, 
there is an optimal size of the club, i.e. neither autarky nor full liberalization is desirable.  
The above analysis focused on the polar case—full or no risk sharing. There is a growing 
consensus that in a financial crisis it may be desirable to restrict capital outflows (as under IMF’s 
program with Iceland). The externalities associated with these capital outflows were sufficiently 
negative that the benefit of the restriction was viewed to exceed the cost. This is an example of 
what we call a circuit breaker, a rule that limits the transfer of funds in and out of a country 
under certain circumstances and therefore limits the extent to which an adverse effect in one 
country can, through interlinkages, spread around the world. Simulations within a variant of our 
model show that an appropriately designed circuit breaker can be welfare enhancing. 
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III. Comments on different architectures.  
Our canonical model shows that the risk that a firm or a country’s  “capital” would fall 
below the threshold level could increase with integration. With downward amplification and 
correlation, the risks of adverse outcomes are even greater. But in fact, as recent and earlier 
crises illustrate, many firms (countries) undertake similar activities. Indeed, implicit 
compensation structures often encourage them to do that. It means that they are unlikely to do 
much worse than others—and with everyone being graded on the curve, that is what matters. It 
can be shown that there are (from a social perspective) incentives for undertaking excessively 
correlated strategies. But even without such correlated business strategies, common macro-
economic shocks can induce high levels of correlation, and with correlation the benefits of risk 
diversification are reduced and the risks of contagion increased. As we noted earlier, the relative 
performance of different architectures may depend on the extent of correlation of shocks and 
behaviors.  
This analysis also ignores the diminution of asset quality that results from increasing 
information imperfections typically associated with more extensive financial market integration, and especially securitization. On the other hand, our analysis has omitted the benefits from risk 
sharing in good states—the production function is linear above S*. Still, simulation exercises, 
combined with intuitions about diminishing returns to risk sharing, suggest that full integration 
may not be desirable even with reasonable degrees of concavity of the production function.  
A. Other applications.  
While our analysis has focused on global financial integration, many of the same issues 
arise domestically. For instance, if a country has a number of universal banks, following 
correlated strategies, then episodically, such a country might face systemic crises. By contrast, if 
a country developed specialized banking institutions, subject to quite different shocks, they may 
not all fail contemporaneously. While the real estate banks may fail more often that they would if 
they were more diversified, the financial system as a whole might fail less frequently, 
particularly if there were provisions for expansion of sector banks into other areas in times of 
exigencies. By the same token, financial linkages across firms, e.g. through credit default swaps, 
may enhance systemic vulnerabilities. 
B. Concluding comments.  
This paper, focusing on risk, has just touched the surface of the complexities of optimal 
financial architectures. Even ignoring issues raised by learning, information asymmetries, and 
institutional coordination, it has been shown that full integration may be less desirable than 
previously thought. There is a rich policy and research agenda ahead.  References 
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